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THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: HOW VIGILANTES
FIND JUSTICE FIGHTING GOVERNMENT
FRAUD AND CORRUPTION
Wayne Turner*
INTRODUCTION

Dante's Inferno reserves a special place in Hell for grafters, those corrupt officials who betray the public's trust for personal financial gain. In the Eighth Circle, grafters are hurled into a pit of boiling pitch by boar-like demons led by
Malacoda. 1 The demons seize upon those who fail to remain submerged by tearing at their flesh with grappling hooks.2 The boiling pitch symbolizes the grafters'
sticky fingers in pocketing public funds. Just as their crimes went largely undetected, the grafters dwell below the surface. The demon-boars reflect the grafters
as pigs feeding at the public trough. 3 In Dante's world, the grafters deserve eternal torment for the harms they inflict upon society.
Today, grafters continue to inflict horrific harms upon society, often by exploiting the most vulnerable among us.
* A nursing home resident develops maggots in her mouth and dies of
larvae infestation because the facility staff failed to provide basic oral
hygiene care.4
* A pharmaceutical company markets a sham medical device to generate
tens of millions of dollars in profit from medically unnecessary prescrip5
tions for AIDS patients.
* Medical providers increase profits by diluting chemotherapy medication
6
administered to cancer patients.
*

The author is a co-founder of ACT UP, the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power in Washington,

D.C. He earned his J.D. magna cum laude from the University of the District of Columbia David A.
Clarke School of Law in May 2008.
1 DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY, THE INFERNO, CANTO XXI, CIRCLE 8, BOLGIA 5
(John Ciardi trans., Mentor Books 1954) (1306-21).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 181 ed. note.
4 Gregory E. Demske, Assistant Inspector General for Legal Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., Statement before the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging: Abuse of Our Elders:
How We Can Stop It, (July 18, 2007), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2007/07/t20070718d.
html.
5 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Serono to Pay $704 Million for the Illegal Marketing of
AIDS Drug, (Oct. 17, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/October/05-civ-545.html.
6 Paul J. McNulty & William W. Mercer, HIPAA Ten Years Later: A New Initiative for Expanding Enforcement, U.S. Attorneys' Bulletin, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Vol. 55, No. 4, at 2 (July 2007).
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Private citizens prosecuted the preceding offenses using a Civil War era law that
has found new life after its initial passage 150 years ago. The False Claims Act
allows individuals who uncover public corruption to file civil suits against wrongdoers and share in a portion of the recovery.7 Forming an army of citizen-prosecutors, the False Claims Act serves as a last line of defense against government
corruption when official forms of oversight prove to be flawed or ineffective.
This comment focuses on the False Claims Act and its increasing potential to
bring greater accountability to government programs designed to serve disadvantaged populations. Citizen avengers play an increasing role in seeking retribution
against grafters because existing safeguards built into government contracting
and procurement often fail to ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent efficiently.
The False Claims Act, the citizens' tool against fraud, is contrasted with the Inspectors General, the federal government's principle means of investigating,
au8
diting, and prosecuting fraud in federal agencies and programs.
Section I describes the False Claims Act and its role in supplementing, and in
some cases supplanting, the Inspectors General in combating waste and fraud, as
well as new efforts to strengthen and expand the Act. Section II examines the
origins and authority of the Inspectors General along with the unfulfilled promise
of this office, where investigative priorities are often driven by political and ideological concerns or lack of resources. Section III reviews recent instances of
waste, fraud, and mismanagement in federal programs-programs designed to
help the very neediest among us-by tracking the failure of governmental oversight in the disasters of Hurricane Katrina and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. This
comment concludes with a discussion of the untapped potential of the False
Claims Act as a tool for citizen watchdogs to step in when the government fails to
bring greater accountability to federal programs designed to aid those in need.
I.

A.

THE FALSE CLAIMS

AcT: AN

OVERVIEW

A Brief History of the False Claims Act

Actions brought under the False Claims Act ("FCA") are known as qui tam,
short for the Latin "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte se-

quitur," meaning "who sues on behalf of the king as well as himself." 9 Qui tam
actions date back to English law of the thirteenth century, under which private
citizens could bring actions on behalf of the public interest. 10 The earliest applications were in criminal law where, due to lack of adequate law enforcement, individuals acted as citizen-prosecutors. English law allowed for these individuals to
7 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-2733 (2006)).
8 Inspector General Act of 1978 § 2 (1), 5 U.S.C. app. § 3 (2006).
9 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1282 (8th ed. 2004).
10 See Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 81, 83 (1972).
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bring actions against criminal wrongdoers and collect a percentage of the mone11
tary penalty upon conviction.
In 1863, Congress passed the first version of the FCA, known at the time as the
Informer's Act, in response to Civil War profiteering. 1 2 President Lincoln urged
Congress to pass the Act to address overcharging by government contractors and
the provision of substandard materials, including artillery shells filled with sawdust and rancid rations for Union troops. 1 3 The Act provided for civil and criminal penalties, including a $2000 fine for each false claim submitted, and required
culpable defendants to pay double the amount of damages to the United States.14
Private citizens were allowed to file suit under the Act and, if successful, were
15
entitled to fifty percent of the government's damages.
The FCA underwent little change until the 1940s, when a major overhaul restricted the Act's use. The overhaul mandated that a private citizen bringing an
action, called a relator, could do so only based on information not in possession
of the government-in other words, the relator must be the original source of
evidence identifying the fraudulent claim. 16 Congress intended to correct earlier
perceived abuses of the FCA, such as actions either brought as a form of harassment or based upon publicly available information such as news reports.1 7 The
1943 amendments allowed for the government to take over an action; and reduced the award for successful relators to ten percent of the recovery in actions
prosecuted by the government and twenty-five percent for actions in which the
government declined to join.' 8 Although the final version signed into law by
President Roosevelt omitted the bar on relators who were not the original source
of information, considerable litigation established that being the original source
of a fraud allegation was a prerequisite for a private citizen filing an action under
the False Claims Act.19
B.

The Modern False Claims Act

Congress revitalized the False Claims Act in 1986 after the General Accounting Office estimated that up to ten percent of the entire federal budget was being
11
12
13

Id. at 86.
S. REP. No. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273.
Aaron R. Petty, How Qui Tam Actions Could Fight Public Corruption, 39 U. MICH. J.L.

REFORM 851, 865 (2006).

14
15
16
17
18
19

Id.
Id.
S. REP. No. 99-345, at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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squandered through fraud and abuse. 20 With this revitalization, Congress emphasized that most fraud goes undetected and that only a small percentage of investigations lead to prosecution and recovery. 21 The Senate Judiciary Committee
and the
report announced: "[O]nly a coordinated effort of both the Government
22
funds.",
public
defrauding
of
wave
this
decrease
will
citizenry
The False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 modernized the statute that President Lincoln had demanded 120 years earlier. 23 The amendments enhanced incentives for citizen actions, increased penalties for those who defraud taxpayers,
and established jurisdiction, procedures, and theories of liability in qui tam suits.
24
Since the 1986 amendments, there has been "an explosion in qui tam litigation.,
Between enactment of the 1986 amendments and July 2007, over 5600 actions
have been filed under the FCA and more than fifty-three percent of these concern health care-related fraud. 25 In health care settings, which generate the majority of FCA suits, the fraudulent actions are generally for misrepresentation,
overcharging for goods or services, and failing to either perform a service or provide all the goods or services promised. 26 Medically vulnerable and at-risk populations have realized the biggest benefit from the 1986 Amendments with over
$20 billion redirected into essential programs as a result of recoveries from those
who have committed fraud against the federal government.27
The FCA allows for a private citizen to bring a civil suit when the defendant
knowingly submitted a false or fraudulent claim to the federal government or to
an entity administering a federally funded program and when the relator, the
plaintiff, is the original evidentiary source of the false claim.2 8 The FCA creates
four areas of fraudulent activities that constitute false claims. The first imposes
general liability and applies to any person who "knowingly presents, or causes to
be presented . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" by the
government.29 The second area relates specifically to those who create a false
record or statement to obtain a government payment. 30 The third is a conspiracy
provision for those participating in activities that defraud the government. 31 The
20 Id. at 3 (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS:
How EXTENSIVE IS IT? HOW CAN IT BE CONTROLLED? (1981), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/

Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=78443).
21 S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267.
22 Id.
23 See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-2733 (2006).
24 Petty, supra note 13, at 869.
25 McNulty & Mercer, supra note 6, at 2.
26 See generally David C. Hsia, Application of Qui Tam to the Quality of Health Care, 14 J.
LEGAL MED. 301 (1993).
27 153 CONG. REC. S11,506 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2007) (statement of Sen. Grassley).

28
29
30
31

See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-2733 (2006).
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006).
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006).
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3) (2006).
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fourth area, known as "reverse false claims," makes liable individuals who with32
hold the full payment due the government, such as royalties or reimbursements.
The FCA requires no specific intent to defraud the government. A false claim
is "knowingly" presented by individuals with "actual knowledge" and those who
act in "deliberate ignorance" or in "reckless disregard of the truth., 33 Congress
adopted a broad definition of "knowing" to address the prospect of upper-level
managers who may seek to insulate themselves from the actions of subordinates
when a "reasonable and prudent inquiry" would have revealed the fraudulent
action-analogized to an ostrich who has buried his head in the sand.34
When a FCA action is filed with the court it is kept under seal for sixty days
and, instead of being immediately served on the defendant, the complaint is
served on the federal government. 35 The relator must also provide the government with "material evidence and information" for review. 36 The government
then has sixty days to review the complaint and the evidence to determine
whether it will enter the suit. 37 If the government declines to "take over" the
action, the relator may pursue the suit on his, or her, own. 38 The Department of
Justice ("DOJ") insisted on this sealed-complaint provision to protect possible
ongoing criminal investigations and not "tip off" suspects.39 Upon a showing of
"good cause," the government may petition the court for an extension of the sixty
day period in which the complaint is under seal.4 ° Should the government decide
to enter the suit, it assumes primary responsibility for the prosecution.41 The government may also petition the court to limit participation of the relator upon a
demonstration of undue delay, repetition in the proceedings, or harassment of
42
the defendant.
The FCA further provides that the government may not settle a suit over the
objection of the relator, unless a hearing shows that the settlement is fair and
reasonable.43 This provision derives from a nineteenth century decision in which
the court determined that a relator maintains a property interest in a pending qui
tam action that may not be divested by the government without adherence to the
procedural due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.4 4
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(4-6) (2006).
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(103) (2006).
S. REP. No. 99-345, at 20, (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5285.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2006).
Id.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(A)-(B) (2006).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B) (2006).
S.REP. No. 99-345, at 24.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (2006).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (2006).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(C)-(D) (2006).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B) (2006).
S. REP. No. 99-345, at 10. (citing United States v. Griswold, 30 F. 762 (C.C.D. Or. 1887)).
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The 1986 Amendments raised the amount of damages from double the total
sum of the false claim to triple the amount fraudulently billed to, or withheld
from, the government and established civil penalties of $5000 to $10,000 for each
false claim submitted.45 Congress also increased the amount awarded to the individual who initiated the action. In suits prosecuted by the government, the relator
is entitled to between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the proceeds, dependent
upon value of the evidence provided and the extent to which the evidence or
information "substantially contributed" to the successful prosecution of the
suit. 4 6 In cases where the government declines to join the suit, the relator may be
awarded between twenty-five and thirty percent of the damages."7
C. A Hopeful Future for the False Claims Act

In late 2007, Senator Charles Grassley, author of the 1986 Amendments, introduced a bill to expand the scope and utilization of the False Claims Act."8
Grassley conceded that the FCA "may not be as effective as intended.""49 His
proposal extended the statute of limitations for filing from six years to ten.5 0 It
also explicitly allowed a government employee to file a qui tam action when the
employee discovered fraud and reported it to her supervisor, the inspector general, and the Attorney General; but only if the government fails to act upon the
allegations within twelve months.51 Grassely's bill unanimously passed the Senate
Judiciary Committee, however it was not scheduled for a floor vote.5 2 In the
111th Congress, Grassley introduced a substantially similar measure emphasizing
of the FCA, particularly in regard to the
the need to clarify judicial interpretation
53
contentious issue of standing.
1. Establishing Standing
The issue of standing for a qui tam relator is a threshold jurisdictional issue. A
relator must be the original source for the information or evidence of the false
claim upon which the suit is based. 5" The FCA defines an original source as "an
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on
which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (2006).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2006).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2006).
False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, S. 2041, 110th Cong. (2007).
153 CONG. REC. S11,506 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2007) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, S. 2041, 110th Cong. § 6 (b)(1) (2007).
ld. at §3.
S. REP. No. 110-507, at 10 (2008).
155 CONG. REC. S 2425, 2426 (Feb. 24, 2009).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006).
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the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the
' 55
information."
In Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, the Supreme Court barred
recovery of a relator because he failed to qualify as an original source for all of
the claims ultimately decided.56 The relator, James Stone, was an engineer at a
Rockwell nuclear weapons plant who identified instabilities in both a toxic waste
storage process that could lead to leaks and a projected piping system from
sludge ponds that could cause environmental contamination. He reported his
findings to his supervisors: they fired Mr. Stone and proceeded with the project. 58
Mr. Stone approached the FBI with his report of flaws in the toxic waste storage
system. 59 The ensuing investigation revealed that Rockwell made false representations and concealed facts from the Environment Protection Agency and the
Department of Energy. 60 Mr. Stone filed an FCA action, in which the government later joined, but the Supreme Court ultimately dismissed his complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. 61 The Court narrowly construed the original source requirement and found that although Mr. Stone had direct knowledge of potential defects, he did not know that (1) Rockwell failed to remedy the defects, (2) the
toxic waste actually leaked, and (3) Rockwell made false statements to the gov62
ernment, until after these facts became public knowledge.
Under Senator Grassley's bill, claims exclusively based on public disclosure of
information in hearings, audits, or reports may be dismissed upon motion by the
DOJ. 63 This correction precludes the jurisdictional defense upheld in Rockwell
by making such dismissals the "exclusive right" of the government.6 4 Grassley's
bill also addresses Rockwell's narrow reading of the statute, requiring that a relator be the original source of all claims, by establishing that an action may be
dismissed "if the allegations relating to all essential elements of liability of the
action or claim are based exclusively on the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions."65 This will allow a relator to recover in a FCA action when the
original information leads to an expanded government investigation and findings

55 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2006).
56 Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 475 (2007).
57 Id. at 460-62.
58 Id. at 461-62.
59 Id. at 461-62.
60 Id. at 463.
61 Rockwell Int'l Corp., 549 U.S. at 463-65, 478-80.
62 Id. at 476.
63 False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, S.2041, 110th Cong. § 4(b)(4)(A) (2007).
64 Press Release, Sen. Charles Grassley, Grassley, Durbin, Leahy, Spector Sponsor Legislation
to Fortify Taxpayers Against Fraud (Sept. 12, 2007), available at http://grassley.senate.gov/index/
cfmFuseAction=pressReleases.Detail&PressRelease.
65 False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, S.2041, 110th Cong. § 4(b)(4)(A) (2007) (emphasis
added).
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of fraud. 6 6 The bill additionally provides that since individuals who obtain information under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") do not create a public
disclosure; they may base a claim, in part, on evidence of fraud obtained through
a FOIA request.67
2.

Expanding Liability

The Grassley Bill also addressed the D.C. Circuit's decision in Totten v. Bombardier Corp., which barred a False Claims Act action when fraudulent invoices
were paid by a non-governmental entity using government funds. 68 In Totten, a
whistleblower filed a qui tam action against a supplier of defective rail cars to
Amtrak. 69 In a split decision, written by now-Chief Justice John Roberts, the
D.C. Circuit held that the claim was not actionable because the FCA required the
fraudulent claim to be presented to "an officer or employee of the United States
Government." 7 0 Therefore even though government funds paid for the defective
rail cars, the "plain language" of the FCA required direct submission of the in71
voice to the government.
The decision in Totten had serious implications for FCA filings in regard to
Medicaid fraud at both the federal and state levels. States administer Medicaid by
using federal and state funds; the federal contribution, between fifty and seventy
percent, is based on the state's poverty level.7 2 At least one court followed Totten
and found that the FCA did not cover state Medicaid programs because invoices
are submitted to state officials instead of officers or employees of the federal
government.7 3 The DOJ, however, has successfully argued that the FCA applies
to federal funds supplied to state Medicaid programs because state administrators
"re-present[ ] that claim to the federal government., 7 4
Senator Grassley's proposal creates liability for those who submit false or
fraudulent claims "for Government money or property"; this effectively shifts the
75
focus of the statute from the presentment of payment to the source of funding.
The health care industry expressed alarm at such an expansion of the FCA. One
attorney warned that the proposal would "sharply increase liabilities for health
66 See Press Release, Sen. Charles Grassley, supra note 64.
67 False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, S.2041, 110th Cong. § 4(b)(4)(B)(ii) (2007).
68 United States ex rel. Totten v.Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
69 Id.
70 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006).
71 Totten, 380 F.3d at 490.
72 Notice of Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Programs, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,613
(Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Nov. 24, 1997).
73 Unites States ex rel. Atkins. v. Mclnteer, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1304 (N.D. Ala. 2004).
74 Daniel R. Anderson, Medicaid Fraud Enforcement, ATrr'Y GEN. BULL. No. 55-04, at 20,
HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (July 2007) (listing cases in which
FCA liability was attached to "federal portion of the Medicaid claim, and not the states' share").
75 False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, S. 2041, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2007).
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care organizations and providers because a number of defenses would be stripped
out of the statute."'76 Grassley noted: "[A]lready we have the pharmaceutical
companies out working against this legislation. So this may not be easy to get
through. 77
D.

Collateral Legislative Incentives to Increase False Claims Act Litigation

Congress sought to increase utilization of the False Claims Act with a series of
amendments to the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ("DRA").7 8 This measure
targets fraud in the Medicaid program, where both the federal and state governments provide funding for health care services for low-income residents. Under
the FCA, allegations of fraudulent Medicaid claims apply only to the federal government's portion of Medicaid funding. 79 The DRA now encourages states to
either adopt the FCA, or strengthen their own statutes to mirror the federal law,
by mandating that ten percent of the federal recovery amount be granted to
states whose laws are in accordance with the federal statute. 80 Further, the DRA
amendments authorize the Office of the Inspector General for the Department of
Health and Human Services to evaluate state false claims acts for compliance
with the federal provisions and fully prosecute fraudulent Medicaid billing to
thirteen states have
both federal and state governments. 81 As of March 2009,
82
been found to qualify for enhanced Medicaid recovery.
A second provision of the DRA requires medical providers who bill Medicaid
more than $5 million per year to institute an employee education program that
includes detailed information about: (1) the False Claims Act; (2) the prevention
and detection of fraud and abuse in federal health care programs; and (3)
whistleblower protections. 83 Because the employee education requirement commenced on January 1, 2007, its effects have yet to be fully realized in the context
of qui tam filings.

76

Bill Would Ease Way for Whistleblower Cases, Increase Types of Eligible Claims, 11 HEALTH

CARE FRAUD REPORT (BNA) 671, 672 (Sept. 26, 2007).

77 153 CONG. REC. S11,506 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2007) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
78 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 47 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
79 Anderson, supra note 74, at 19.
80 42 U.S.C. § 1396h (2006).
81 Id.; Notice of Publication of OIG's Guidelines for Evaluating State False Claims Acts, 71
Fed. Reg. 48,552, 48,553-54 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Aug. 21, 2006).
82 U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Office of the Inspector General, State False Claims
Act Reviews, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/falseclaimsact.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
83 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(68)(A) (2006).
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II.

THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF INSPEcTORS GENERAL

As social service programs and government spending proliferated in the late
1960s and early 1970s, Congress became alarmed that fraud, abuse, and waste
had reached "epidemic proportions., 84 In its first annual report to Congress in
1977, the Inspector General of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") estimated that HEW annually misspent between $6.3 and $7.4 billion-approximately five percent of its total budget. 85 Further, investigations by
other agencies, including the FBI and the General Accounting Office, uncovered
egregious examples of funding abuses that both alarmed congressional appropriators and garnered media attention.8 6 In response, the House Subcommittee for
Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources convened a nine-day public
hearing to document the deficiencies in current governmental oversight
87
capabilities.
While many agencies already had investigators in place, across the board their
resources and authority were limited. The Department of Transportation, for example, had only four inspectors for its $6 billion national highway construction
program.8 8 Lack of investigative authority caused even bigger problems. As a
general rule, agency investigators were required to obtain permission from
agency heads or deputies before launching investigations. And, in some cases,
investigators were not only denied permission to proceed but also refused access
to documents and other information needed to adequately investigate allegations
of impropriety in federal agencies and programs.89
A.

The Inspector General Act of 1978

Congress addressed the issue of widespread fraud in government spending by
passing the Inspector General Act of 1978 ("IGA"). 90 The IGA updated the original Office of Inspector General ("OIG") established in 1976 in HEW, a prototype that proved to be so successful that Congress expanded the program and
modeled other Inspectors General after it.91 The IGA became effective on October 1, 1978 and created independent OIGs within a dozen federal departments
and agencies, including: the Department of Agriculture, the Department of
84 S. REP. No. 95-1071, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2676, 2679.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 4.
87 Id. at 5.
88 Id. at 4.
89 S. REP. No. 95-1071, at 4.
90 Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. app. § 3 (2006)).
91 S. REP. No. 95-1071, at 8.
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Housing and Urban Development, the Environmental Protection Agency, and
92
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
To help ensure independence of the OIG, the IGA requires that each Inspector General be appointed by the President, subject to the advice and consent of
the Senate, and that the position report directly to the agency or departmental
head. 93 The IGA further stipulates that the head of an agency or department may
in no way impede the Inspector General from initiating or conducting any audit
94
or investigation.
Several other IGA provisions attempt to safeguard the OIG from undue influence or political pressure. An Inspector General may be removed from office by
the President; however, the President must communicate the reasons for doing so
to both houses of Congress.95 By requiring an explanation for removal, Congress
intended to circumvent the Supreme Court's holding in Myers v. United States,
which affirmed the President's unfettered right to remove executive branch officers without interference from Congress. 96 Additionally, non-legislative measures have been taken to protect the integrity of the Offices of Inspector General.
In 1996, President Clinton issued an executive order authorizing the President's
Council on Integrity and Efficiency to investigate allegations of impropriety or
misconduct by Inspectors General, report the results of that investigation, provide any necessary referrals to the FBI, and make recommendations to the
President.9 7
Congress added another feature designed to enhance the independence of the
OIG. The IGA provides that OIG reports be transmitted directly to Congress
without editing by the Office of the Secretary or an agency head.98 Generally, a
department's communications with Congress, including committee testimony, are
vetted by upper-agency officials. 99 Congress recognized that these officials may
be reluctant to highlight the deficiencies of their programs, particularly before
Congressional appropriators. 10 0 While the IGA does allow agency officials to
submit written comments along with the OIG's report, Congress emphasized that
the requirement for reports to be transmitted without alteration or deletion is
92 Inspector General Act of 1978 § 2(1), Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified
at 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a) (2006)).
93 Inspector General Act of 1978 § 3(a), Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified
at 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a) (2006)).
94 Id.
95 Inspector General Act of 1978 § 3(b), Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified
at 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(b) (2006)).
96 S. REP. No. 95-1071, at 26 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
97 Exec. Order No. 12,993, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,043 (Mar. 21, 1996).
98 Inspector General Act of 1978 § 5(a), Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified
in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
99 S. REP. No. 95-1071, at 6.
100 Id.

as amended
as amended

as amended

as amended
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"fundamental" to the IGA. 1° 1 Finally, to strengthen the authority of the OIGs,
the offices were given subpoena power enforceable through the U.S. District
Courts.

10 2

B.

Shortcomings of the Inspector General Act

Thirty years after passage of the Inspector General Act, the safeguards incorporated into the IGA have proven inadequate because the independence of
OIGs is not fully protected nor are they shielded from political influence. Stewart
Bowen, Jr., the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, was targeted
by Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee when they inserted a
clause into a military authorization bill that would have terminated Bowen's office.10 3 Bowen "exposed disastrously poor construction work by well-connected
companies like Halliburton" as well as bribery, conspiracy and missing weapons
shipped to Iraqi security forces. 10 4 Although the provision eliminating the Iraq
Reconstruction Inspector General was removed from the bill, Bowen soon was
under investigation by "an oversight committee with close links to the White
House and by the ranking Republican on the House Government Reform
10 5
Committee.'
In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security's Inspector General, Clark
Kent Ervin, was replaced after delivering "a series of hard hitting reports on
management problems at the agency.' 1 6 Ervin had been a recess appointment
whose bid for a full term was dropped from Senate consideration after the withdrawal of White House support. 10 7 Ervin later lambasted administration officials
for attempting to silence watchdogs speaking "truths to power." He noted that
other Inspectors General had caught fire for exposing the misuse of taxpayer
funds, such as the Inspector General for the General Services Administration
who was called a "terrorist" by his agency head.'0 8
Other Inspectors General whose independence and authority have been compromised include:
101 Id. at 31.
102 Inspector General Act of 1978 § 6(4), Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
103 James Glanz, Auditor in Iraq Finds Job Gone After Exposgs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2006, at
Al.
104 Id.
105 James Glanz, Inspector of Projects in Iraq is Now Under Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2007, at A14.
106 Official Loses Post at Security Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2004, at A34.
107 Id.
108 Clark Kent Ervin, Op-Ed., Watchdogs, Not Lapdogs; Inspectors GeneralHave Come Under
Fire For Doing Their Job. They Need Safeguards, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 2007, at A23.
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Howard Krongard, Department of State, allegedly interfered with his
office's ongoing investigations "to protect the State Department and
White House from political embarrassment."' 0 9
" Robert Cobb, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, "suppursuing
pressed investigations and penalized his own investigators for' 110
allegations of theft, safety violations, and other wrongdoing."
* Debra Ritt, the Smithsonian Institution, was pressured to drop audits
that revealed excessive spending on travel and other expenses by high
ranking officials. When she refused, her budget was cut by the Smithsonian Secretary. 1 '
"

Political influence not only can protect favored businesses and individuals
from the scrutiny of Inspectors General, it also can turn the OIG into a political
weapon. In 2001, Representative Mark Souder demanded an audit of the Stop
AIDS Project, a San Francisco-based group, citing "offensive" federally funded
HIV prevention programs that targeted sexually active Gay men.11 2 After
months of scrutiny, federal auditors concluded that the Stop AIDS Project complied with funding guidelines established by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention because the program's materials had been reviewed and approved by
the San Francisco Department of Public Health. 113 The Washington, D.C.-based
watchdog group OMB Watch issued a report warning of the chilling effect of
federal audits on progressive organizations and highlighting a "pattern to limit
the advocacy voices of non-profits" by the Bush Administration; this report cited
14
the Stop AIDS audit as an example of ideologically-driven, punitive auditing.
III.

HIDDEN IN PLAIN VIEW - FRAUD IN FEDERAL PROGRAMS

Defrauding the government is considered by some a victimless crime. Indeed,
the DOJ notes that health care fraud is "still perceived as a low risk/high reward
115
crime" with few repercussions for those who exploit government programs.
109
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A.

United States v. Serono Laboratories:A FCA Action Exposed a
Multi-Million Dollar Fraud

In October 2005, U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales announced a settlement agreement with pharmaceutical giant Serono Laboratories, Inc. ("Serono") that included guilty pleas from Serono executives on charges of fraud and
conspiracy, and a total of $704 million in fines and damages. 116 This settlement
stemmed from a False Claims Act action filed by former Serono employees in
2000.117
With the advent of protease inhibitors in the early 1990s, fewer HIV/AIDS
patients were experiencing the kind of severe wasting syndrome for which Serono's anti-AIDS wasting drug, Serostim, was prescribed. 118 Serono executives
forecasted a steady decline in drug sales, and devised a scheme to increase sales
of Serostim. 119 From 1996 to 2004, Serono marketed Serostim by using an
adulterated, unapproved medical device that falsely diagnosed wasting syndrome
in AIDS patients. 120 Serono reconfigured an existing medical device that sent
electric impulses through attachments to the hand and foot with software designed to indicate a loss of cell mass in patients, which Serono termed "hidden
AIDS wasting." 121 Although the device and its software were never approved by
the Food and Drug Administration, the mechanism came into widespread use as
a result of Serono's aggressive marketing efforts. 12 2 As part of a nationwide plan
to market its new diagnostic method, Serono provided prominent physicians an
all expense trip to Cannes, France for a "conference," if they prescribed more
than $6 million in Serostim in six days. 123 Serono also set quotas requiring a minimum number of Serostim prescriptions and provided incentives for recruiting
other physicians.1 24 Investigators concluded that eighty-five percent of the125Serostim prescriptions written during this period were medically unnecessary.
For several years Serono's scheme remained undetected by program monitors
and auditors at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Then, in
2000, Serono employee Christine Driscoll filed a qui tam action under the FCA
116 Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks at the Press Conference Regarding
Agreement with Serono Labs, (Oct. 17, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/
2005/ag-speech 051017.html.
117 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 5.
118 United States v. Serono Laboratories, Inc., No. 05-CR-10282, 2005 WL 2778027 at *3 (D.
Mass. Oct. 17, 2005).
119 Id.
120 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 5.
121 Serono, 2005 WL 2778027 at *18.
122 Id. at *3.
123 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 5.
124 Serono, 2005 WL 2778027 at *66.
125 Ross Kerber, Pharmaciesthat Sold AIDS Drug by Serono May Face US Inquiry, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 19, 2005, at 1.
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with allegations of fraud, conspiracy, and false marketing. 126 FCA claims by four
other employees soon followed. 1 2 7 And, the California-based AIDS Healthcare
Foundation filed suit in 2004.128 The United States elected to intervene. 129 The
total cost of the scheme is inestimable. Serostim was expensive-a twelve-week
course of the drug cost $21,168.130 Medicaid programs paid for approximately
eighty percent of all Serostim prescriptions nationwide and Medicaid claims from
1997 through 2004 exceeded $600 million. 131 Serono's potential exposure for
damages under the FCA alone totaled $1.8 trillion.132 In addition, Serono could
have been liable for a $5000 penalty for each Serostim prescription found to be
133
medically unnecessary and resulting from its fraudulent marketing scheme.
Not surprisingly, Serono settled.
The $704 million Serono settlement was the third largest health care fraud recovery in history. 13 4 The relators in the FCA suits shared approximately $51.8
million. 135 State Medicaid programs were reimbursed $262 million and the remainder went to the federal government. 136 For Serono, however, the litigation
saga did not end with this settlement: it settled another lawsuit, filed by private
and self-insured health plans, for $24 million in 2007.137
It is not surprising that federal authorities failed to detect the Serono scandal.
For years AIDS activists complained that lax oversight of federal AIDS programs
led to funding abuses in Puerto Rico, Indiana, California, North Carolina, Texas,
and Florida. 138 Because their call for federal attention was ignored, these funding
abuses were largely uncovered by local community advocates. 139 However, their
efforts ultimately convinced Congress to include a provision in the Ryan White
CARE Act Amendments to require random audits of HIV/AIDS programs and
126 United States ex rel. Driscoll v. Serono Laboratories. Inc., Civ. No. 00-11680-GAO, 2008
WL 728939 (D. Mass. Mar. 18, 2008).
127 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 5.
128 Press Release, AIDS Healthcare Found., Whistleblower AHF Applauds Serono's $704 Settlement for Illegal Marketing of AIDS Drug Serostim, (Oct. 17, 2005), availableat http://www.prnews
wire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/10-17-2005/0004170999&EDATE=.
129 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 5.
130 Serono, 2005 WL 2778027 at *5.
131 Serono, 2005 WL 2778027 at *30.
132 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (2006) (providing for treble damages, and a minimum $5000 fine
for each false claim submitted to the government).
133 Id.
134 Anne Marie Squeo & David Armstrong, Serono Pleads Guilty Over AIDS Drug, WALL
STREET

J., Oct. 18, 2005, at A14.
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136 Id.
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providers.14 ° Since the passage of these amendments in 2000, there have been
dozens of audits of AIDS programs, some leading to criminal prosecutions. 14' In
August 2006, a Florida physician was sentenced to a sixty-five month prison term
and ordered to pay $1.3 million in restitution for billing Medicare for HIV/AIDS
medical services that were never provided. 142 And, an eighty-year-old physician
was sentenced to eighteen months in prison and ordered to pay $5.1 million in
restitution for administering AIDS drugs that were unnecessary and in some
43
cases harmful to patients.'
While the increased auditing has begun to yield results, health care fraud continues to be a growing area of concern, investigation and litigation for both federal authorities and whistleblowers. Because Medicaid programs annually spend
$300 billion of state and federal funds,' 44 it is no surprise that more than seventyfour percent of recoveries under the FCA are from health care related fraud.' 45
B.

A Likely Future for the False Claims Act and Government Fraud

The next wave of grand-scale government fraud and potential FCA actions is
likely to occur in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Relief spending for
these disasters has been fraught with corruption while hundreds of thousands of
residents continue to live in squalor and reconstruction efforts stagnate. An estimated $120 billion has been appropriated by the federal government for disaster
relief and reconstruction efforts.' 46 However, the Inspectors General from the
myriad of federal departments and agencies participating in relief efforts reviewed only 775 contracts with a total value of $13 billion. 1 47 According to the
Government Accountability Office, as much as $1 billion has been either fraudulently or improperly
paid out by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
8
14

("FEMA").

140 Ryan White CARE Act Amendments of 2000 § 2675A, 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-75(a) (2006).
141 See generally U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs. Office of the Inspector General, http://
www.dhhs.oig.gov/oas (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
142 Florida Physician Receives 65-Month Prison Term for Bogus AIDS Billings, 10 HEALTH
CARE FRAUD REPORT (BNA) 624 (Aug. 16, 2006).
143 Octogenarian PhysicianSentenced to Prison,Restitution, in $7 million HIV Medicare Fraud,
11 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT (BNA) 750 (Oct. 10, 2007).
144 Anderson, supra note 74, at 17.
145 McNulty & Mercer, supra note 6, at 2.
146 PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT, FEDERAL CONTRACTING: LESSONS LEARNED
FROM HURRICANE KATRINA, 3 (2006). available at http:l/www.pogo.org/pogo-files/reports/contractoversight/federal-contracting-katrina/.
147 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, OVERSIGHT OF GULF COAST HURRICANE RECOVERY, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS OCT. 1, 2006-MARCH 31, 2007 11 (2007),
available at http://www.ignet.gov/pande/hsrl.html#relief.
148 Greg Kurtz, Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigation, Statement
before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: Hurricanes Katrina
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Priorities in investigating and prosecuting waste and fraud often are not only
limited by resources but also driven by politics. A lack of independence coupled
with political influence has marred the promise of existing governmental oversight and investigating authorities, such as the Inspectors General and the DOJ.
For example, the DOJ's Katrina Fraud Task Force has focused its investigative
and prosecutorial efforts on individuals filing multiple or fraudulent claims for
disaster relief, instead of contracting and procurement.1 49 The Task Force's mission is to combat "all types of fraud relating to Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath," including charity fraud, identity theft, procurement and governmentbenefit fraud; however, the Task Force directed its attention entirely on the
150
latter.
As of March 31, 2007, the federal government conducted over 2000 investigations related to Katrina relief spending, resulting in 749 indictments and 397 convictions. 15 1 Yet, as the public interest group Project on Government Oversight
noted, "The majority of the indictments, arrests, and convictions have been
against individuals who defrauded the government in petty crimes, rather than
contractors caught exploiting the system on a large scale. 15 2 The apparent overemphasis on individual claimants, and the resultant lack of emphasis on investigating corruption and fraud in contracting and procurement, led Congressional
Democrats to launch their own investigation and report.1 53 Their report highlights $8.75 billion in federal contracts, mostly with private businesses, that "have
154
experienced significant overcharges, wasteful spending, or mismanagement."
The Blue Roof Program is a prime example: tarps distributed to help shield property from further damage were "inflated as much as 1700% of their actual cost
155
... overbilling the government by $15.5 million."'
By using competitive bidding, a cost-saving measure in procurement, the government awards contracts in a manner which ensures that taxpayers get the maximum return on their investment. Nonetheless, government officials continue to
use sole-source contracting that often steers billions of dollars for public projects
to political allies. The government granted sole-source contracts to giant corporaand Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (Dec. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07252t.pdf.
149 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Hurricane Katrina Fraud Task Force, http://www.usdoj.gov/katrina/
Katrina-Fraud/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
150 Id.
151
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tions with histories of fraud, conspiracy, worker retaliation, money laundering,
and environmental violations-Halliburton/KBR, Bechtel, Fluor, and CH2M, to
name a few.1 56 Blackwater contracted with FEMA to supply armed mercenaries
to patrol the streets of New Orleans after Katrina: a "success in procuring federal
contracts [that] could well be explained by major-league contributions and family
connections to the GOP," including an $80,000 contribution to the Republican
National Committee in October 2000.157
Where the Inspectors General either cannot, or will not, conduct audits and
investigations, the False Claims Act offers hope for community advocates to target large government contractors currently exploiting the devastation along the
Gulf Coast.
CONCLUSION

Recent reforms and new proposals promise to expand the use of the False
Claims Act and are designed not only to facilitate citizen actions against government fraud but also serve to deter fraud or misuse of government funds. The
potential for exposure under the FCA has led some organizations to clean house
and create corporate compliance training for board members and staff in order to
reduce or eliminate fraudulent activity, and thereby potential liability.
Department of Defense contractors have been the traditional targets of FCA
actions. More recent targets include pharmaceutical giants and health care conglomerates. Non-traditional targets, such as non-profit relief agencies and charities receiving federal funds have largely escaped FCA litigation. For example, in
2005, officials at District of Columbia's Whitman-Walker Clinic admitted
overcharging the District government by more than $2 million for laboratory testing fees. 158 The Clinic's potential exposure under the FCA, including fines and
treble damages, would have been in the tens of millions.1 5 9 Remarkably, instead
of recouping the taxpayers' dollars,
District officials approved a $2.5 million
160
bailout package for the Clinic.
By contrast, the False Claims Act helps to ensure accountability from even the
most venerated charities. With growing awareness and the prospect of large monetary awards, the FCA has the potential to create a veritable army of citizen
watchdogs seeking out fraud and abuse. When funding intended to help the poor,
sick, and vulnerable is diverted, embezzled, abused, or squandered, fewer dollars
156 Id. at 12.
157 Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater Down, THE NATION, Oct. 10, 2005, at 5, available at http://www.
thenation.com/doc/20051010/scahill.
158 Lou Chibbaro, Jr., Whitman-Walker Lays Off50, Slashes Budget, WASH. BLADE, June 3,
2005, available at www.washblade.com/2005/6-3/newsflocalnews/whitman.cfm.
159 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (2006).
160 Lou Chibbaro, Jr., Catania Proposes Emergency Bill for Clinic, WASH. BLADE, June 17,
2005, available at www.washblade.com/2005/6-17/news/localnews/cantina.cfm.
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are available to help the intended beneficiaries who continue to suffer. Those
who steal from charity, and thus profit from the suffering of others, have their
own special place in Dante's Hell. In the meantime, the False Claims Act provides grafters with their own day of reckoning, in court.

